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The post-Mao rural reforms have been generally accepted as a step 
forward in improving human conditions in rural China. It is true 
that in areas such as Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu improve- 
ment is impressive, though in other areas improvement has affected 
only a portion of the population.1 This study of one village, Gao Vil- 
lage, argues that in some areas rural life is not a clear-cut picture of 
total improvement since 1978. It shows that there are definite gains 
obtained in Mao's China that have been lost in the post-Mao period, 
and that de-collectivization cannot be taken for granted as a solu- 
t i ~ n . ~  Of course, a case study of Gad Village cannot be used for gen- 
eralizations for all of China. One aim of the present study is to show 
the frustration of generalizations. Rural China cannot be taken as a 
single block, and what applies in one area may not apply elsewhere. 
More importantly, this study shows that even in one village, it is 
not simply a case of either improvement or lack of improvement. 
Each period of development is characterized by gains in some as- 
pects and losses in other aspects in rural life. While referring to some 
aspects of life before 1949 the paper focuses on comparing the devel- 
opments of Gao Village during the Mao period with the post-Mao 
period. In the post-Mao period three development phases can be 
distinguished: the first phase during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the second phase during the late 1980s, and the third phase during 
the early 1990s. There were gains as well as losses in the first phase; 
there was definite deterioration in many aspect of rural life during 
the second phase and there are uncertainties and new prospects 
during the third phase. 
By referring to life in Gao Village before 1949 and by comparing 
the commune period of Mao's China with the post-Mao reform pe- 
riod up to the end of the second phase, the paper argues that rural 
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I development since the 1950s in Gao Village has been in many ways 
I involutionary: in terms of land holding, health care and living 
1 conditions, not much has changed in four decades. The paper does 
I not claim that no progress has been made since 1949. The child 
~ 
mortality rate has been dramatically reduced, as a result of which, 
the population only doubled in forty years. Other progress such as a- 
vailability of chemical fertilizers and new crops have contributed to 
I the increase of grain production. However, the increased population 
1 
I living on the same amount of land means that improvements in liv- 
I ing standards are hardly substantial. Forty years of development has 
I 
I brought Gao Village to where it began: a poverty trap and a struggle 
1 
I for survival. It was an involutionary de~e lo~rnen t .~  
I When we come to the third phase, however, the picture looks 
I 
I radically different. Because of the stagnation of rural life and the in- 
creasing opportunities offered by the coastal industrial develop- 
ments, many young villagers have left Gao Village as migrant work- 
ers. This fact has led to an increase of cash income for the village on 
the one hand and reduction of reliance on land on the other. As a re- 
sult, the possibility of a breakthrough of involutionary development 
exists for the first time in Gao Village. 
Methodology 
I was born and brought up in Gao Village and lived there until 1973. 
My relatives are still living in that part of China and we have con- 
tinued to have contacts with each other. The information and data 
contained in this study are based on written records, interviews and 
corres ondence as well as diaries, recollections and personal experi- P 
ences. While personal recollections and experiences cannot be repli- 
cated, similar information and data can be obtained by conducting 
field work in Gao Village or any neighbouring village if there is no 
official interference. 
This paper is also based on two field work trips to Gao Village. 
One trip was made during the end of 1992 and early 1993 and an- 
other was made from April to May 1994. Each trip lasted about a 
month, and in-depth interviews were conducted with the elderly 
villagers who recollected their days in Mao's China as well as their 
life before 1949. Former commune, production brigade and produc- 
tion team leaders, present village heads, local xiang5 government of- 
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ficials, and family members of the former landlord and rich peasant 
were also interviewed. In order to examine the "pull and push" fac- 
tors of migrant workers and the social and economic consequences 
of migrant work, I also conducted interviews with Gao villagers who 
were working in Xiamen and Shenzhen. If figures are of any signifi- 
cance in this case the peo le interviewed during the two trips were 
no less than one hundred. f' 
Gao Village: Some Background 
Gao Village is a small-sized village by local standards and now has a 
population of 318 (168 of them males) and arable land of 308 mu.' It 
is located near China's second largest fresh water lake, the Boyang 
Lake, in Jiangxi Province. It is a remote village in the sense that it has 
no access to a railway line; nor has a water transportation system 
been developed though it is near a river that leads to the Boyang 
Lake. The village has not had a bus route until the late 1970s and 
most of the villagers do not travel anywhere further than several 
kilometres away by foot. The nearest town is Boyang County Town 
which is about 150 kilometres away. However, the village is not a 
remote mountainous place where there are hardly any people 
around. There are many villages surrounding Gao Village, most of 
them much bigger and some of them have more than one thousand 
households. Like Gao Village those surrounding villages are also 
one-surname clan villages. 
Gao Village is one of these idyllic villages suitable for a self- 
sufficient economy: plenty of rainfall and four clear-cut seasons 
which provide a climate for growing all kinds of crops; hilly but not 
mountainous land where firewood can grow on dry land and rice 
can grow in paddy fields; and a river plus many ponds and creeks 
which can provide fish and water resources. The "self-sufficiency" in 
this area has been such that up to the present day there is not a sin- 
gle marketplace within the neighbourhood of three kilometres. The 
villagers do not have any memory of war, The Japanese never pene- 
trated this area, nor had the military fighting between the Comrnu- 
nists and the Nationalists affected the village. 
When the Communists took over the village in 1949 it had 280 mu 
of arable land which was distributed among twenty households. 
When the Land Reform started, one household was classified as 
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landlord, another as rich peasant, twelve households as middle 
peasants and six as poor peasants. The average poor peasant house- 
hold had about six mu of land; the average middle peasant house- 
hold had about 13.8 mu of land. The landlord had forty-five mu of 
land and the rich peasant had thirty-three mu of land.8 The landlord 
Gao Tianqiang was classified as a landlord largely because he did 
not work on the land he owned. He rented the land to some poor 
peasants while he worked as village sishou t e a~he r .~  
Land Reform was soon followed by the cooperatives. Then it was 
the commune system during which period the issue of land holding 
was of no importance for our discussion. The 308 mu of land at pres- 
ent has been distributed equally among the villagers according to 
the number of people in each ho~sehold. '~ Usually, the land is redis- 
tributed every three to five years to accommodate the change of 
number of people in each household. However, the local authorities 
can decide to keep the distribution unchanged for a longer period of 
time though the government policy until 1993 was to encourage 
regular change in an attempt to adjust demographic changes, possi- 
bly for the reason of equity.'' In 1991, the household that has the 
biggest share of land had about fifteen mu of land while the smallest 
share per household was about three mu of land. 
In relative terms, the present land holding is more equal than be- 
fore 1949. However, in absolute terms the average household is 
worse off than before. At present, each household has an average of 
6.2 mu of land and each person has 0.96 mu of land whereas before 
1949, even the poorest household had six mu of land and each per- 
son had an average of 1.7 mu of land. The reason is simply that by 
1949 there were only 160 people and twenty households in the vil- 
lage while now there are 318 people and fifty-one households. By 
1991, of all the households in the village, 60 percent were middle 
peasants who had an average of 13.8 mu of land,12 which was only a 
little below that of the biggest "landowner" who had about fifteen 
mu of land. The reason for the twofold increase in population is 
partly due to the reduction of child mortality, an issue to be dis- 
cussed presently, and partly due the partial failure of the govern- 
ment's population control policy, the reason of which, again, is dealt 
with in the next section. The simple logic is that the land in the vil- 
lage cannot be expanded any further to accommodate the population 
growth. Therefore, there cannot be any improvement in land holding. 
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Developments Since 1949 
As we have seen, the population in Gao Village virtually doubled in 
forty years since 1949. The pattern of increase can be categorized into 
three periods: the first fourteen years from 1949 to 1963, the second 
fifteen years from 1963 to 1978, and the third thirteen years from 
1978 to 1991. The four decades are so divided because they are re- 
lated to differeht child mortality rates, health care systems and 
population control policies. 
Child Mortality 
From 1949 to 1963, sixty babies were born,13 of which twenty-four 
died when they were children. The mortality rate was 40 percent. 
During the period from 1963 to 1978, the mortality rate was 6.6 per- 
cent. From 1978 to 1991, the rate was seven percent. The mortality 
rate from 1963 to 1991 remained stable and the rate of mortality 
during the post-Mao reform period was slightly higher than that in 
the period from 1963 to 1978 in Mao's era. The high mortality rate 
during the period from 1949 to 1963 is perhaps not unexpected given 
that the period covers the Great Leap Forward, during which time 
the peasantry suffered the most in Mao's China. However, that is 
only part of the story, as we shall see shortly. 
Health Care System 
The period from 1958 until 1961 was the most difficult time in any- 
body's memory for the Gao villagers. It was in those years that a 
woman hanged herself because of family difficulties. It certainly was 
not the best of times to have babies. However, a possible explanation 
for the high mortality rate during the period of fourteen years from 
1949 to 1963 lies largely, if not completely, in the lack of a health care 
system. Until 1962, there had not been a single doctor of any qualifi- 
cation in modern medicine within a fifty kilometres neighbourhood. 
Just as in the years before 1949, there was not any medical treatment 
for simple illness such as pertussis, malaria, diarrhoea, let alone 
pneumonia or hepatitis. If a child fell ill, the parents had only two 
resorts: To pray to the Buddha or to seek a Chinese traditional 
medicine doctor who was usually self-trained and inclined to per- 
form all kinds of dubious practices. Unless it could build up its own 
resistance, the choice for a sick child was virtually waiting for 
death.14 Since the 1960s the situation dramatically improved because 
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1 1  vaccination for common deceases such as cholera, measles, small- 
pox, mumps and encephalitis was introduced to the village. Sec- 
ondly, two doctors who practiced both Chinese and Western medi- 
I 
I cine were sent by the government to be stationed in Gao Village in 
1963.15 These two doctors also trained a boy from the village who, 
when the two old doctors left, worked as a "barefoot" doctor in the 
I village during the Cultural Revolution. Evidently, the dramatic re- 
I 
, duction in child mortality rate was more a result of the accessibility 
i to modern medicine than a change in the economic system.16 
I As for health care, the years between 1963 and 1978 were Gao 
I Village's golden time. With little cost before the Cultural Revolution 
I and virtually nothing during the Cultural Revolution the villagers 
had access to a medical system that basically worked. However, 
I 
1 since the post-Mao reforms the situation began to change. With the 
I abolition of the "barefoot" doctor system, medical practice became privatized. There are now three doctors for about five thousand 
people in nine villages. None of the doctors is stationed in Gao Vil- 
lage and the nearest medical clinic is two kilometres away. Accord- 
ing to the village committee's estimate, 20 percent of the families in 
Gao Villa e do not go to see the doctor simply because they cannot 
18 
afford it. The practice of praying before the Buddha has started to 
thrive again. Whether the slight increase of mortality rate in the 
post- Mao period has anything to do with the change in the health 
care system cannot be firmly established; but the difficulties facing 
some of the villagers are real and acute. 
Population Control 
The major theme of the paper is that within the framework of the 
present economic structure the incorrigible demand on the limited 
amount of land by the increasing population makes any substantial 
improvement in living standards difficult. The variables involved in 
the population index are very complex. Let us consider three most 
obvious variables: cultural tradition, government policy and social 
security. It certainly is the case in Gao Village that the tradition of 
requiring a male to carry on the family tree is a very strong factor 
that influences population growth. Gao Changxian, for instance, 
now has three children, with two girls born first and second. He 
would not stop until he had the third child that was a boy. It is a 
built-in common sense in Confucian ideology that the more children 
one has the happier one's family will be. But we have to remember 
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that cultural influence has been a consistent factor, and, if anything, 
this traditional influence should have been weakened by forty years 
of Communist rule. Therefore, traditional influence does not tell us 
all about the variation of population growth in Gao Village. 
The second factor is that a measure of security is important. At the 
time when modern medicine was not available one rationale for 
having more children was that because children are an insurance 
measure for old age more children are needed because some may 
die. With the reduction of the child mortality rate the rationale for 
having more children as a security measure is not so acute since the 
chance of the child surviving is very big. However, a girl in the fam- 
ily does not provide security for the parents because she will marry 
away. Therefore, the need of a boy usually means a larger family. Fi- 
nally, government policy is certainly instrumental in population 
growth in Gao Village. However, because of the dismantling of the 
commune system and the distribution of land to individual house- 
holds, there are factors which work against the government's policy 
of population control. One such factor is that it has taken away much 
of the power that the local cadres used to have over the peasants and 
therefore deprived the grass-root organisation of an effective 
mechanism to carry out a population control policy except by brute 
force.18 Another factor is that it has given the peasants a strong in- 
centive to produce more children. The peasants want to have more 
children, in fact the more the better, because until the 1990s land in 
Gao Village had been distributed to each household according to 
nothing but the number of people. lg 
Education 
The post-Mao reform policies have had detrimental effects on edu- 
cation. During the 1963 to 1978 period, Gao Village had one univer- 
sity student, eleven middle school students, fifteen primary school 
students up to grade five; and 86 percent of all the children under 
the age of sixteen had finished schooling up to grade three. How- 
ever, from 1978 to 1991, there were only five middle school students, 
nine primary school students up to grade five; and only 51 percent of 
all the children under the age of sixteen had finished schooling up to 
grade three.20 There has not been a single university student since 
1976. There was one university student from the village thanks to the 
"worker-peasant-soldier student" programme imposed by the radi- 
cals during the Cultural Revolution. Between 1949 and 1962, there 
46 The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 10 0 95 
I Involutionary Rural Development and the Possibility of a Breakthrough 
was no one who attended school up to middle school level. How- 
ever, the government did impose some kind of "literacy" evening 
classes on the adult population during the Great Leap  orw ward." 
Unless there is a career opportunity other than farming there was 
generally no incentive for a farmer to send a child to school in Gao 
Village. Until the early 1990s almost 22 everybody in Gao village was 
destined to work on the land and one does not need to be educated 
to carry out the kind of farming task that is done in traditional ways. 
Usually, girls suffer most because a family does not want to invest, if 
there is any incentive to invest at all, in a girl who is to be married 
away. However, girls fared much better during the period from 1963 
to 1978 since 40 percent of the 86 percent of all children under the 
age of sixteen, who went to school, were girls. Of the fifteen children 
who had finished primary school at that time three were girls, which 
was 20 percent whereas between 1978 and 1991 none of the nine 
five-grade students were girls.23 
A school catering for grade one, two and three was set up in 1972, 
again imposed by the Cultural Revolution policy, in Gao Village. 
Most children under the age of nine went to school at that time be- 
cause it was convenient and, above all, it was virtually free. An 
equally important factor was that in the commune system, even a 
poor family was not compelled to make use of child labour, because 
everyone was guaranteed the same amount of food no matter how 
much work a family contributed to production activities. A village 
school of the same scale still functions today; and children at the age 
of six, seven and eight do attend the school. However, 90 percent of 
the female and 30 percent of the male children did not go to school 
beyond year three during the 1980sZ4 in spite of the fact the Chinese 
government introduced the compulsory primary education law all 
over the country.25 This is the case because the post-Mao reform 
policies have had several consequences that are detrimental to edu- 
cation. One of them is that whoever sends a child to school is di- 
rectly responsible for much of the cost. The government at present 
pays 30 percent of the teacher's salary. The rest of the cost, including 
textbooks and stationary, are paid for by the villagers themselves. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the government was responsible for at least 50 
percent of the teacher's salary plus some other costs. The rest of the 
cost was pooled together by the As a result, a family did 
not have to pay for a child's education in cash, as it is the practice now. 
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The other effect on education in consequence of the "responsibility 
system" is that a family is compelled to make full use of child labour. 
Child labour can be in the form of, for instance, grazing a buffalo, or 
baby-sitting a younger member in the family so that mother can go 
out to work. Some girls even cook for the family at the age of nine. 
Within the commune system, first there was no compelling reason 
for a family to make use of the child since every person was distrib- 
uted an equal amount of food irrespective of how much the mother 
worked. Secondly, some work could be rationalized and therefore 
there was no need for child labour. Nowadays, for instance every 
family needs one person to graze the buffalo if the family owns one 
whereas in the commune system one or two people could look after 
all the buffalos in the village. During the early 1970s the village col- 
lectively built a school house. But when the de-collectivisation took 
place in the early 1980s the school house was dismantled for re- 
distribution. Since then the teacher has to find classrooms in her or 
his own house. 
Living Standard 
The measurement of the living standard is, of course, complex. 
However, with a presentation below of various factors involved, a 
sketch can be drawn which shows that living standards have not 
been substantially improved either by Mao's revolution, or by the 
post-Mao reform until the 1990s. 
Housing. Before 1949, there were twelve houses: eight large brick 
houses, two small brick houses and two mud houses. One of the 
small brick houses belonged to the teacher landlord and the other 
belonged to the rich peasant. Each of the large brick houses belonged 
to a clan of families who were either middle or poor peasants. In 
1949, the Land Reform team confiscated the landlord's brick house 
and the landlord was moved to a mud house. Apart from that, 
housing ownership remained unchanged. The seven large brick 
houses, which were all of the same patterns with very thick brick 
walls, cool in summer and warm in winter, were particularly good 
for living. They all faced the south, with two spacious rooms on both 
the east and west sides and a rectangular room at the back. In the 
middle of each house there was a big hall, so big that the hall was 
divided into two parts by a huge skylight right in the middle of the 
roof through which when it rained water fell into a pool inside the 
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house. The pool was built with elegant large slate stones under 
which water was channelled away. Attached to each of these houses, 
there was a small cottage used as a kitchen, usually for two or three 
families of the same clan. 
With the increase of population since the 1960s, the existing 
houses became inadequate while the peasants had not been able to 
build new houses. What happened as a solution was that the peas- 
ants dismantled these ingeniously built large houses and used the 
materials to construct smaller houses for more families. From 1949 to 
1978 two large brick houses were torn down in this way. From 1978 
to 1991, another three of these houses were dismantled to build 
smaller houses to accommodate more people. 
By the early 1990s, half of the households in Gao Village have 
built "new houses", albeit small and primitive. The bricks and wood 
from the old houses alone were not enough for the construction of 
these new houses. Two other factors contributed to this "real estate 
boom", which are discussed later in the paper. One factor is that 
during the early 1980s there was some substantial increase in income 
thanks to the price increase in agricultural produce. The other factor 
is the cash income from migrant workers. 
There is only one really newly-built house that is of brick and ce- 
ment and two storeys. That house was built during the post- Mao 
reform period by a "get rich first household". The man who owns 
that house was an orphan adopted by a villager in the early 1960s. It 
so happened that the boy's uncle is in the building industry in Jing- 
dezhen, which is the oldest porcelain producing capital in China, 
two hundred kilometres away. Through his uncle's connections, the 
orphan boy, now grown-up, was able to contract a number of 
building works in the 1980s. He made his fortune by making full use 
of cheap village labour and became the village's only "Ten Thousand 
RMB Household. 
Food Consumption and Diet Composition.There is a Chinese saying 
which goes: min yi shi wei tian. Tian "heaven" or "sky" is the biggest 
and most sacred thing in the world and min, the ordinary Chinese, 
take shi, which is food, as tian, that is, as the biggest and therefore 
the most important thing in the whole world. This is the case be- 
cause the Chinese have never been far away from starvation. Al- 
though grain production has increased steadily since the 1960s the 
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fundamental problem of feeding the population in Gao Village re- 
mains the same, if not worse, after forty years of development. 
After the turmoil of the Great Leap Forward, the situation began 
to stabilize in Gao Village. Chemical fertilizers and new types of 
crops such as short stock rice crops were made available to the peas- 
ants. Short stock rice was accepted by the peasants because it can 
stand up to wind whereas long stock rice may fall to the muddy 
ground just before harvesting. The short stock also has the advan- 
tage of needing fewer days to grow. All this has indeed increased 
output. The average output of rice per mu before 1949 was about two 
hundred kilograms whereas now one mu of land can produce about 
five hundred kilograms. However, this increase was not just a result 
of the introduction of new technology. It was also the result of 
harder work. What happens is that, thanks to the shorter life span of 
the short stock rice, the peasants plant rice twice a year, once in 
spring and once in summer. It is the two harvests together that en- 
ables the peasants to produce five hundred kilograms of rice per mu. 
What this means is that the peasants work much harder than they 
used to do before 1949. .The elderly always have a fond memory of 
not having to work so hard when they were young. 
Because of the introduction of new technology, the farming costs 
are higher than before 1949. Chemicals cost dearly whereas previ- 
ously all the peasants needed was recycling human and animal 
waste. The other consequence of having two harvests of rice in one 
piece of land is that the planting of winter economy crop on that 
same piece of land is extremely limited. As a result, the peasants' in- 
come as a whole suffers from the loss of other economy crops. And yet the 
peasants need the rice, which is the staple food, to feed the people. 
The introduction of chemical fertilizers has had serious ecological 
consequences that have greatly affected the villager's way of life. 
There used to be a water resource system consisting of a number of 
creeks and dozens of ponds that were all channelled into a river 
which in turn runs towards the Boyang Lake. During the raining 
season in spring a variety of aquatic animals from the Lake migrated 
upwards to live and breed in the creeks and ponds. Fish, shrimps, 
crabs, shell fish, eels were the villagers' valuable food resource and it 
was free for all. Water weeds and aquatic vegetables of all kinds 
were a natural diet for pigs which in turn were a major source of oil, 
protein and organic fertilizer for the villagers. Frogs, which are natu- 
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ral controllers of harmful insect to the rice crop, were also a source of 
food. Even twenty years ago, swimming while catching fish was a 
simple fact of life and joyful games for children. Now, thanks to the 
chemical fertilisers and insecticides, things have all changed. Fishing 
is not a routine any more in Gao village. A source of healthy and 
virtually free food has therefore disappeared. As a result, the villag- 
ers' diet composition has become less colourful and less healthy. 
The poverty of the diet composition resulting from ecological de- 
struction has not, of course, occurred overnight. It happened grad- 
ually and it is slightly compensated by improvement from other 
sources of nutrition during the 1990s. During the 1970s, an average 
villager consumed five kilograms of meat annually.27 Since 1978, the 
amount of meat the villagers can afford remained the same each year 
until the 1990s when the villagers have some disposable cash thanks 
to migrant workers.28 The villagers do raise pigs; but usually they 
have to sell their pigs to the state in return for cash. During the 
Spring Festival many families kill their pigs; but they can afford to 
retain only a small part of the meat for self-consumption. Both before 
and after the commune system the village has placed a ban on rais- 
ing chickens because free range chickens destroy crops. When I vis- 
ited the village, friends and relatives had to purchase eggs from the 
nearby market for me as a treat. The pattern of a poor diet began to 
change only in the early 1990s as a result of cash income from mi- 
grant workers. 
Quality of Life and Consumer Goods. A noticeable improvement is the 
availability of consumer goods since the later 1980s. Even up to the 
later 1970s, the villagers would use cotton produced in their private 
plots to weave cloth for their own use. Every family used to have a 
traditional tool to make threads out of cotton. Women and girls 
would work, usually in winter, until midnight to make the threads. 
When enough threads had been made, a local craftsperson would be 
invited to the household to weave the cloth. There were two cloth 
weavers in Gao Village, a man and a woman. Then the farmers 
would use traditional technique to dye the cloth which was made 
into shirts, trousers, and padded coats. I can still remember that a 
white cotton shirt was a luxury because it needed frequent washing 
and therefore was less durable. Only the newly-wed bride could ex- 
pect some cloth made from industrial fabric. In recent years, clothes 
have become much cheaper in comparison and no one in the village 
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weaves cotton cloth any more. They all like to wear clothes made of 
synthetic fabrics which look modern and are easy to wash. 
There are now forty-two bicycles in Gao Village whereas in the 
early 1980s there were only two and in the 1970s there was none. 
There was no electricity in the village until the late 1980s. There are 
now also one colour and fifteen black and white television sets in the 
village, Young people start to possess things like a watch. In the 
1970s this would be luxury unheard of. Some youngsters have 
started to wear Western style clothes brought back by their migrant 
working brothers or sisters from the outside world. Rubber boots are 
no longer a luxury as they used to be. Small consumer items such as 
a pair of gloves and socks, a torchlight, a hat and a scarf are no 
longer a major consideration in the family budget as they used to be. 
However, we cannot simply take for granted that the increased 
consumption of commodity goods is an indication of increased in- 
come as a result of de-collectivisation. The picture is far more com- 
plex. For one thing, consumer goods are simply much cheaper now 
than, say, ten years ago, thanks to the industrial boom since the 
1980s. For instance, an average ordinary watch costs around fifty 
RMB, or even less, nowadays whereas its cost was at least 120 RMB 
before 1978. The other factor to consider is that since the late 1980s 
Gao villagers have not increased their income from their agricultural 
work. Instead, the source of their cash income is from migrant work- 
ers which is further discussed below. 
Quality of life is, of course, hard to measure. However, there are 
some ways of doing so, one of which is by way of comparison. With 
few exceptions, all the villagers born before 1949 are nostalgic about 
the good old days when life was easy and peaceful. All they can say 
about the only landlord in the village are good things: gentle, kind 
and helpful.29 In comparison, the local communist cadres, especially 
those who formed "the work teams" sent by the government from 
time to time during the communist rule of four decades, are bullies 
and brutal. What the villagers complain about most is the famine 
during the Great Leap Forward years, and the fact that now they 
have to work harder just to feed themselves and that still there is 
hunger from time to time. 
The majority of Gao villagers are of middle peasant background 
and were doing fine before 1949.~' Compared with the old days they 
now live in worse housing conditions and yet they have to work 
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harder. During the commune system they worked for longer hours, 
twelve hours a day during busy seasons and eight to nine hours a 
day during slack seasons, mostly engaged in organized irrigation 
work. The average number of working days were three hundred and 
thirty a year.31 The older villagers keep on saying that before 1949 
they did not have to work more than three hundred days a year, 
with an average of eight hours a day. One of the reasons for so much 
work during the commune period is that there was always irrigation 
and infrastructure work organized by the commune. Since the dis- 
mantling of the commune system the work load in that respect has 
been gradually reduced almost to zero in Gao Village. But the fact 
remains that villagers have to plant rice twice a year, as opposed to 
once a year before the 1950s. 
Apart from the destruction of aquatic life, the population pressure 
has had other environmental consequences. Before 1949, even in the 
early 1960s, there were bushes and small forests around the village 
where the children could play and where mushrooms and firewood 
could be picked. At that time, the villagers could use rice stock as 
firewood for cooking. However, with the introduction of short stock 
rice there was little rice stock to burn. With the increasing pressure 
of population, trees and bushes have gradually been cut for fire- 
wood. Now there are hardly any trees, let alone bushes. 
Life before 1949 could not have been rosy for Gao Villagers; but 
the diet seemed to be richer before environmental destruction. Com- 
pared with the past there are now more natural disasters, especially 
floods, which occur more often these days. In fact, Gao Village ex- 
periences flooding ever year since the later 1960s, sometimes minor 
3Y 
and sometimes major. The explanation for this is not hard to find. 
With the increasing pressure of population, the peasants everywhere 
around the Boyang Lake started to reclaim arable land from the Lake 
and the rivers surrounding it. They have encircled the edges of these 
rivers and the Lake itself by building numerous dykes so that what 
was inside the dykes became rice fields.33 The net effect of this mas- 
sive water work engineering is that during the rainy season, which is 
between late spring and early summer when the rice is about to be 
harvested, the water level in the Boyang Lake gets higher and higher 
while the water level inside the dykes is also rising to the extent that 
water pumps are unable to cope. Even when the dykes are strong 
enough to hold the water from outside, there is still flooding inside 
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the dykes. Sometimes flooding from outside occurs even at the time 
when Gao Village is having a drought. This is the case because the 
area surrounding the Boyang Lake is so large that there is always 
somewhere where it rains. When flooding is serious, which is the 
case once every three years in Gao Village, the peasants go hungry. 
Sometimes when failures of crops become too serious as a result of 
having drought and flooding at the same time the villagers have to 
buy grain from the state in order to avoid famine.34 
Working conditions have remained unchanged in four decades. 
The peasants still have to use the wooden plough pulled by a buf- 
falo; they still plant rice bunch by bunch manually; they still thresh 
the rice manually by beating the rice stock against a wooden board. 
The villagers have never been able to buy a tractor or harvesti& ma- 
chine. In those days when everybody was working for the com- 
mune, hard work was compensated in a way by a spirit of coopera- 
tion. Because the villagers usually worked in groups, they could talk, 
joke and gossip while working. When they stopped to rest, they 
could tell stories. There was a collective culture which made the 
backbreaking labour less unpleasant and more bearable. The young 
villagers especially liked to work in groups. With the dismantling of 
the commune system, what is left is the stark necessity for each fam- 
ily to toil for survival. 
During late 1960s and early 1970s life was much more colourful 
and the villagers began to enjoy recreation activities. From time to 
time school children were organized to perform dances and put up 
plays for the villagers. Loudspeakers were installed to broadcast 
news from home and abroad. The young people themselves were 
organized to perform the model Peking operas. It is true that all this 
was politically motivated and organized by the government. But for 
the villagers it was great entertainment through which they learned 
new things and experienced unprecedented cultural activities. There 
was also a boost of sports, again, something unprecedented. Table 
tennis was a great game for children and the village even con- 
structed a basketball court, to the tremendous delight of the young 
people, During slack seasons and Spring Festivals friendly basketball 
matches were organized among the neighbouring villages.35 
Thanks to the post-Mao reforms, nothing of this kind has ever 
been organized since 1978.~' Whatever existed before has been 
abandoned. People hardly get together let alone organize cultural 
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activities. The only time the villagers, especially the young ones, can 
look forward to activities is the Spring Festival each year when they 
visit relatives. Occasionally, the villagers may go and watch a traditional 
folk play performed by some theatrical group. The themes in those plays 
are usually, as Mao Zedong commented, about ghosts and emperors, 
which, though not less politically indoctrinating, are completely irrelevant 
to the villagers' desires and aspirations. Since the late 1980s, however, this 
is compensated by the accessibility of television. 
Life Expectancy.There is no official record of life expectancy either be- 
fore or after 1949. However, if memory is anything to go by, the lack 
of modern medicine did not mean that the villagers, once they sur- 
vived as children, lived a shorter life. Indeed, the old villagers count 
on their fingers and concluded that in the old days an average per- 
son (discounting child mortality) lived up to the age of ~ i x t ~ - f i v e . ~ ~  
According to official statistics since 1949, although even the famine 
during the Great Leap Forward did not claim any life except a 
woman who hanged herself, an average adult villager died at ap- 
proximately the age of sixty. However, life expectancy is much 
longer since the late 1960s because of the reduction of the child 
mortality rate3" 
There are perhaps two major factors which have had negative ef- 
fect on life expectancy since 1949. One is the less healthy diet com- 
position plus harder work. The other is the epidemic outbreak of 
schistosomiasis during the later 1950s and early 1960s. If untreated, 
it usually takes five to fifteen years for schistosomiasis to kill a per- 
son. The flukes are parasitical on snails (thus the disease is also 
called "snail fever"). If one has contact with infected water the flukes 
may invade the body by getting into the blood circulation. For some 
unexplained reason, schistosomiasis became rampant during the 
1950s. Mao's massive movement of wiping out snails, plus free 
treatment for all in the early 1960s did put a stop to the epidemic. 
But the disease still has some effect up to the present.39 
1ncome.There is no official record of personal income of the villagers 
before 1949. We can only compare the Mao era with the post-Mao 
reform period. In a normal harvest year, that is, when there was no 
serious crop failure, the average annual income per capita in Gao 
Village between 1978 and 1992 was 450 RMB." This, compared with 
an average annual income of 250 RMB per capita during the 1949 to 
1978 period, was a considerable improvement.41 However, the rise of 
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income is largely due to price adjustment rather than an increase in 
grain production. In other words, during the post-Mao reform pe- 
riod, the government's effort to raise the price of grain to narrow the 
price scissors's gap between industrial and agricultural products in- 
creased cash income at face value.42 
However, in the case of Gao Village, by the early 1990s this in- 
crease of cash income is a mirage rather than a reality. The reason is 
simple: after paying various kinds of tax which takes away 20 per- 
cent of their annual produce, the peasants do not have any extra 
grain to sell in return for cash.43 In other words, the rise in income as 
a result of a price increase is largely nominal. If the villagers can 
manage to save some grain for sale when the harvests are good they 
have to use that money to pay for the debt incurred during the time 
of crop failure. Just like the years in Mao's era, the tiny amount of 
disposable cash income can only come from the sale of pigs and a 
limited amount of economy crops such as cotton. The villagers can- 
not afford to allocate much land to grow economic crops because 
they need the land to produce grain to feed the family. 
Migrant Work and Its Impact 
Gao Village has had a brief honeymoon with the post-Mao reform 
policies during the early 1980s when prices of agricultural produce 
were raised dramatically, when the prices of industrial goods did 
not follow the increase and when the local authorities had not yet 
started various kinds of taxes and levies. However, since the late 
1980s the situation began to deteriorate rapidly.44 It is migrant work 
which has not only sustained life in Gao Village but also boosted 
consumer spending and thus increased the living standards, that is, 
if the consumption of commodity goods is taken to be a criterion. 
From as early as the Taiping Peasant Uprising to Sun Yat- sen's 
Three Principles of the People, and to the communist revolution in 
the 1930s and then in 1949, equal distribution of land had been 
thought to be the most fundamental solution to China's problems.45 
What happened in Gao Village in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, does not seem to support this assumption. For one thing 
no form of land ownership can eradicate the poverty trap if the in- 
creasing population has to rely entirely on the limited land re- 
sources. By the late 1980s, land in Gao Village had become a burden 
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for taxes and levies. A couple of villagers wanted to give land 
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away. They would prefer to pay 100 RMB to someone to take one 
mu away. In return they only asked those who rent the land to pay 
the taxes and levies imposed on that mu of land. It simply does not 
pay to work on the land any more for basically two reasons: One 
reason is that the cost of fertilizers and pesticides is so high 47 while 
the price of grain is so low, thus comparing the two the effort does 
not create much of a reward.48 The other reason is that various taxes 
imposed on land are so high that working on the land is punitive.49 
In Gao Village, for every mu of rice it costs more than 100 RMB of 
input, excluding labour. Take the case of Gao Changxian who is 
thirty-seven and married with three children. With his mother living 
with him there are six people in the family. He has four mu of paddy 
fields and two mu of dry land on which he grows cotton and rape 
seeds. Four mu of rice yields 2,000 kilograms which gives him 832 
RMB, two mu of dry land yields fifty kilograms of ginned cotton 
which gives him an income of 300 RMB and 300 kilograms of rape 
seed which gives him 360 RMB. The total yearly income is therefore 
1,500 RMB. Input costs are eighty RMB for seed and 648 RMB for 
various chemicals. The average annual taxes and levies are eighty 
RMB per person, which total to 480 RMB for Gao Changxian's fam- 
ily. Their net income in an average year is only 292 RMB. He and his 
wife each spends 180 days in the field, which means that they each 
earn 0.8 RMB a day, which is about $US 0.4.~' 
Government Policies 
Since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has demanded every 
level of local authorities to adopt what is called caizheng baogan zhi 
(financial responsibility system) which basically means that the local 
authorities should be responsible for their own financial income and 
expenditure. This policy has two major consequences. One is the in- 
creasing shrinkage of expenditure on education, health and infra- 
structure, a phenomenon widely reported in the Chinese press.51 The 
other consequence is that local authorities began to impose all kinds 
of taxes and levies on the peasantry to raise financial income. 
The exploitation of the peasantry is, of course, not new to the 
post-Mao regime. According to one estimate, the amount exploited 
from the peasantry by way of a different pricing system imposed on 
agricultural and industrial goods in 1957, 1965, 1971 and 1978 were 
respectively 71 percent, 75.77 percent, 51.6 percent and 39.4 percent 
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of the Chinese government's financial inc0me.5~ Exploitation of the 
peasantry has always been the practice by the CCP government. What is 
new, however, is the arbitrariness of creating new levies and the corrupt 
practices by which the levies are spent by the local auth~rides.~~ 
The Chinese government cannot do much about the situation. 
Premier Li Peng, for instance, emphasized at a planning and finance 
meeting on December 9,1991 that the total taxes and levies on agri- 
culture should not exceed 5 percent of a peasant's annual income.54 
However, until recently the central government has done little to al- 
leviate the burden on the rural people.55 In any case, given the pres- 
ent political and economic structures it is difficult to see what the 
Chinese government can do to remedy the situation. As we can see 
in Gao Changxian's case, taxes and levies amounted to 32 percent of 
his family's annual income. 
Migrant Workers 
As the rural situation began to deteriorate since the late 1980s, de- 
velopments along coastal China also began to have an impact on 
Gao Village. The development of Special Economic Zones and for- 
eign investments as a result of the post-Mao opening up policies 
have provided opportunities for rural young people to earn cash in- 
come. Although working conditions are primitive and even danger- 
ous, and although these rural migrant workers have to work ten to 
fourteen hours a day and six or seven days a week to earn 200 RMB 
to 400 RMB a month they are willing to leave their home and ready 
to plunge into the unknown world. They are willing because working 
conditions at home are no more pleasant while earning far less. It is a 
combination of these "pull" and "push factors that have created a situa- 
tion in which for the first time in the history of Gao Village a breakthrough 
is possible to stop the involutionary rural development. 
By 1992, fifty-two young people, mostly men, had left Gao Village 
as migrant workers and in 1994, when I visited the village again a 
dozen more including several girls had left. They want to leave be- 
cause that is the only way out for them. Some of them have not left 
yet simply because they do not know where and how to go?6 
Migrant work has influenced life in Gao Village in many ways, 
some immediately visible and some far-reaching. The most visible 
and immediate impact is of course the cash remittances from mi- 
grant workers. On average, every migrant worker sends 1,000 RMB 
to 2,000 RMB to Gao Village annually. For a variety of reasons such 
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as family bonds, economic imperatives and a discrepancy of use 
value of the small amount of money between the urban and the ru- 
ral, most of the migrant workers do send their earnings home. Of the 
ones I have interviewed only four teenagers do not send money 
home regularly. Instead, they spend the money on food, clothing 
and gambling. 1,000 RMB may not sound much to urban residents, 
but it has a considerable economic leverage on rural life. It is the 
remittance of the migrant workers that helps pay the debts, purchase 
consumer goods and build new houses, as discussed previously. In- 
deed, by the early 1990s it is difficult to imagine how Gao villagers 
sustain their life without the income from migrant workers. 
Other impacts are far-reaching and more difficult to measure but 
can only be generally discussed at this stage. For instance, it is the 
first time in Gao Village history that life is not entirely dependent on 
land. As indicated previously, for many of them land has become a 
burden of taxes and levies. If the present policies are to continue, 
more and more young people will leave the village, as a result of 
which the pressure of a livelihood placed on the limited amount of 
land available due to the increasing population will diminish. 
There is already evidence of a break-up of self-sufficiency in Gao 
Village. In May 1994 when I visited the village I was surprised to 
find that the villagers had to purchase agricultural produce such as 
cabbage, beans and garlic for their own consumption from a nearby 
marketplace three kilometres away. Formerly, they would grow all 
these things themselves. Or if they did not, like some families who 
did not have enough resources, they would simply have to do with- 
out. Village families also used to make beancurd for self-con- 
sumption. But now they purchase this common food from a special- 
ized household or market. On the one hand they can afford to buy 
other people's labour and on the other there is the beginning of a lo- 
cal division of labour and local market exchange. A further indica- 
tion of commercialization is that village shops have emerged every- 
where in the area. There is also one such shop in Gao Village selling 
anything from light industrial goods to vegetables. All these could 
not have happened without the extra cash income coming from out- 
side the village. 
Equally important is the demographic impact, which involves 
several aspects of development. The rural people usually marry 
young, which means fertility rates are high. However, migrant 
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workers delay their marriage for a number of reasons. First, as mi- 
grant workers, they are preoccupied with "making money". Sec- 
ondly, there is less chance of making contact with the opposite sex 
since most factories have single sex work force and single sex dormi- 
tory. Thirdly, their experience and exposure to urban life make them 
less inclined to accept arranged marriages at home. One girl I inter- 
viewed declared simply that she would never get married because 
she wanted freedom. There is also the possibility that those young peo- 
ple may not want to return once the hukou system is relaxed. If 20 percent 
of the people in Gao Village, all of them young, continue to leave the vil- 
lage and never return, the demographic ramification is very great. 
The other impact is the change of attitude and way of thinking. 
During the early 1980s soon after the dismantling of the commune 
system, all sorts of age-old customs such as arranged marriage, clan 
worship, village feuds came back with great force, as if the suppres- 
sion of those customs in Mao's China in forty years had been blown 
away by a single storm. Also banditry and robbery were increasing 
rapidly in the area. 
As an example of these phenomena, take one case of village feuds. 
In 1989, the people in Jin Village which has more than 3,000 house- 
holds, had a fight with a nearby small village. They used home- 
made cannons and grenades and killed seventeen people from the 
small village. When the county authorities and police came to inves- 
tigate, a disabled man in Jin Village declared that he and he alone 
was responsible for the killing. He agreed to shoulder the responsi- 
bility for the village because he felt that there was not much left in 
his life for a disabled man. In return the village agreed to look after 
his family while he was in prison. The astonishing thing was that the 
county government and police were powerless to do anything other 
than accept the offer. It was a laboratory model of circular develop- 
ment: The area where Gao Village is situated has returned to 1949 
when the communist revolution began, that is, the inaccessibility of 
the state and the powerful rule of the clan system. 
However, by the early 1990s it became quiet on those fronts with- 
out any state intervention. The reason is that in the area where Gao 
Village is located, more than 20 percent of the population had left, all 
of them young.57 
Most migrant workers return home for the Spring Festival every 
year. There is some evidence that they are not interested in the old 
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ways of doing things any more even when they get back home. 
During the Spring Festival of 1992 when I was in Gao Village, the 
village elders had trouble getting enough people to carry out the 
clan worship ceremony. The young people who returned from migrant 
work turned a deaf ear to the elders who were trying to talk them into or- 
ganizing resources to fight a neighbouring Wang Village over a border 
dispute. One old villager who enjoys the most respect in the village turned 
to me for help to vitalize the village spirit for a fight. 
I 
I Conclusion 
In this study of Gao Village a general comparison is made between 
Mao's era and the post-Mao reform period in terms of personal in- 
come, housing, land holding, grain production, child mortality, food 
consumption and diet composition, education and health care. The 
comparison shows that post-Mao agricultural reform policies have 
not resulted in substantial improvement in personal income, hous- 
ing, grain production and food consumption. The only real im- 
provement is reflected in the availability of some consumer items, 
thanks to the industrial development since the 1980s. However, this 
gain is largely offset by losses in the areas of education and health 
care. All in all then, living standards have not been improved as a 
result of post-Mao de-collectivization policies. The responsibility 
system does give the peasants some freedom to do what they want 
with their plots of land and their produce. However, this freedom 
has not been translated into liberation of productivity; nor has it 
given rise to improvements in the quality of life. Patterns of eco- 
nomic and social structure similar to those before 1949 have come 
back. By the late 1980s only the levies and taxes by the local authori- 
ties became more arbitrary. 
Though there is no substantial data to compare the forty years of 
communist China with the time before 1949, a comparison can be 
drawn in some respects. In housing and land holding, the villagers 
became worse off. This is a result of the population increase which 
itself is a result of the reduction in child mortality. As we have seen, 
the effect of the change of the economic system in the child mortality 
rate is marginal. Rather, the reduction of child mortality rate is a re- 
sult of accessibility to modern medicine. Whether any regime other 
than the communist has the political resources to make modern 
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medicine accessible to the peasants is an issue that cannot be pur- 
sued here. But the successful control of the schistosomiasis epidemic 
in the late 1950s does indicate that strong administrative measures 
are needed to organize the peasants to accomplish something sub- 
stantial. In any case, the dramatic reduction of child mortality has 
led the villagers into a population trap which offsets any increase in 
grain production; and the post-Mao household responsibility system 
itself did not help population control in Gao Village. 
In terms of the economic system, forty years of development has 
come full circle: the way by which individual plots are cultivated by 
households is the same as before 1949. In terms of living standards, 
forty years of development has been involutionary: with regard to 
important indicators such as housing and food consumption, the 
villagers are not much better off until the early 1990s. The increase of 
grain production as a result of hard work plus the introduction of 
new technology, which itself has serious ecological consequences, 
have been offset by the population explosion. The only substantial 
improvement in terms of education and health care in the Mao era 
has been set back by the post-Mao reform policies. Unless there is 
some structural change in the source of income it is hard to envisage 
a way to break the self-perpetuating poverty trap aggravated in Gao 
Village by the population trap. 
The change in the income source seems to be within the reach of 
Gao villagers by the early 1990s as a result of industrial expansion 
far away from Gao Village. It is this industrial expansion that on the 
one hand absorbs the surplus labour from Gao Village and on the 
other enables migrant workers to earn cash income for the village on 
the other. The cash income from migrant workers has already initi- 
ated the process of commercialization and has started the break-up 
of self-sufficiency though no sign of qualitative change in produc- 
tion can be detected. The impact of migrant work is manifested not 
only in economic terms but also in political and sociological terms. 
While the economic impact is visible and immediate in terms of bal- 
ancing the family budget and increasing consumer expenditure, the 
political and sociological impacts are less tangible and very difficult 
to assess at this stage. It is far from certain whether China's indus- 
trial development can be sustained at the present rate, which has di- 
rect consequences for Gao Village. Uncertain also is the direction 
which the Chinese government will take with respect to the hulcou 
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system and agricultural policies. If, for instance, China's industrial 
expansion continues and if those migrant workers who left the vil- 
lage are allowed to settle where they work, then Gao Village as an 
economic entity will gradually phase out of existence. It is my un- 
derstanding that the Great Leap Forward could be interpreted as an 
attempt to break the rural poverty trap. But it ended in disaster. 
However, the 1990s, for the first time in Gao Village history, have 
provided the possibility of breaking the self-perpetuation of rural 
development. 
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1 Y. M. Yeung and David K. Y. Chu, 
eds., Guangdong, Survey of a Prov- 
ince Undergoing Rapid Change (Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 1994). 
2 In this respect see W. Hinton, The 
Great Reversal: the Privatization o f  China, 
1978-1989 (New York: Monthly Re- 
view Press, 1990). 
3 For the theory of involutionary rural 
development in traditional China 
see Philip Huang, The Peasant Fam- 
ily and Rural Development in the 
Yangzi Delta 1350-1988 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990). 
4 Personal recollections and experi- 
ences are difficult to scrutinize as to 
their "objectivity" and I am ready to 
admit possible "bias". I hope the pre- 
sent study will lead to an examination 
and reexamination of similar circum- 
stances so that we may 
come to a better understanding of 
what has happened in China. 
5 Xiang is the lowest rural admini- 
stration unit staffed by government 
paid officers. The size of a xiang is 
roughly the same as that of a com- 
mune during the Mao-period. 
6 Apart from interviews, I also exam- 
ined written records such as ac- 
count books of Gao Village and the 
brigade concerning the period from 
1949 to 1979 when the commune 
system was dismantled. Many of 
the documents were dug out from 
dusty and dark corners of the 
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of keeping them. During the field 
work, either in Gao Village or Xia- 
men and Shenzhen, 1 had no inter- 
preters or official company. Be- 
cause of personal contacts, no cen- 
sorship of any kind was imposed. 
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7 One mu of land equals 0.0667 hec- 
tares. 
8 There is no official record available 
for the statistics before 1949. The 
figures in this paragraph are based 
on field work and interviews. 
9 A sishou teacher used to work at his 
(not her!) own home and gave in- 
formal tuition to village pupils and 
in return was paid by whatever 
kind of produce the pupil's family 
could offer. The teaching materials 
were of course classic Confucian 
textbooks. Gao Tianqiang did not 
work with his hands to produce 
grain and therefore was considered 
to be an exploiter. 
10 The village has 28 mu more land as 
a result of reclamation over the years, 
which has exhausted the limit. 
11 On November 5, 1993, the CCP and 
the State Council jointly issued a d e  
cument Zhonggong zkongyang guo- 
wuyuan guanyu nongye he nongcun 
jingji fazhan ruogan zkengce cuoski 
(Several policy measures by the 
CCP and the State Council concern- 
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development). One of the measures 
was zengren bu zengdi, jianren bu ji- 
andi (no increase of land for the in- 
crease of household members and 
no reduction of land for the reduc- 
tion of household members). 
12 Again, these statistics were ob- 
tained from interviews and there is 
no official record available at vil- 
lage level. 
13 Until the early 1980s when popula- 
tion control policy started to be rig- 
orously implemented, birth reg- 
istration was not an issue that con- 
cerned the local government much. 
Women had, and still have, babies 
at home, helped by a local midwife. 
Therefore, there is no official record 
available for the babies born during 
this period in Gao Village. The fig- 
ures were obtained through inter- 
views. 
14 My mother had given birth to six- 
teen children. Three of the four 
born after 1953 survived and out of 
the ten born before 1953, only one 
survived. 
15 This took place after Mao criticized 
the Ministry of Health as "the Min- 
istry for the Urban Lords". 
16 However, whether any regime 
other than the Communist would 
have had the power and mechanism 
to introduce modern medicine to vil- 
lages like Gao is another issue. 
17 Interviews with Gao Village Com- 
mittee member Gao Changquan 
and Gao Changxian in May 1994. 
18 In this respect see, for instance, 
David Zweig, "Prosperity and 
Conflict in Post-Mao Rural China," 
China Quarterly (March, 1986)) No. 
105, pp. 1-18. Also see Renmin R i h ,  
Overseas Edition, October 7,1992, p. 1; 
and May 11,1993, p. 5. 
19 The issue of population control 
policy is very complex. For one 
thing, the central government in 
the past decade changed many 
times its administrative measures 
to control population growth. At 
the same time, local governments at 
every level were allowed to work 
out their own ways of carrying out 
the principle of birth control. 
Therefore, there were all kinds of 
flexibility and variation in popula- 
tion control measures, depending 
on time and place. In this respect 
see S. H. Potter & J. M. Potter, 
China's Peasants: The Anthropology of 
a Revolution (New York, Port 
Chester, Melbourne and Sydney: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
20 The figures here were obtained 
from field work and interviews. 
21 In this respect see Glen Peterson, 
"State Literacy Ideologies and the 
Transformation of Rural China," 
The Australian Journal o f  Chinese Afairs, 
Uuly, 1994), No. 32, pp. 93-120. 
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22 I say "almost" because there were 
usually three ways a villager might 
be able to escape the fate of rural 
life. One was to compete to be re- 
cruited into the army. In forty 
years, three men left Gao Village in 
this way. The second way by which 
a villager might leave permanently 
was to be recruited as a worker. 
Two men in Gao Village who had 
L, 
finished secondary education were 
lucky enough to have become 
workers in the early 1970s during 
the Cultural Revolution. Finally, a 
village could, in theory at least, 
compete to enter a tertiary institu- 
tion and thus be able to lead the 
envied urban life. That was of 
course very difficult if not impos- 
sible unless there is some kind of 
equity policy, like the one imposed 
during the Cultural Revolution. As 
for the young girls, until the early 
1990s, the only chance for them to 
leave the condemned rural life was 
marriage, which occurred occa- 
sionally. 
23 Gao Chaozhen, Gao Village Submis- 
sion for the National Population Sur- 
vey, 1991 (draft version), p. 3. 
24 These figures were given by the 
village teacher Gao Chaozhen in 
the interviews in 1992. 
25 For the rural poor the government's 
law of com~ulsory education is 
something on paper that will have 
no significance in their life unless 
there-is financial assistance and an 
alternative career opportunity. In 
Gao Village, no financial assistance 
is available for even the poorest. 
Real alternative career opportunity 
had not occurred until the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Caused by 
feedback from the coastal South 
indicating that the better you are 
educated the more chance you will 
have to be employed and to have a 
well-paid jobs, more and more 
families are struggling to send their 
children to the school in nearby 
village for education beyond year 
three. It is still too early to evaluate 
statistically the effect of this trend, 
which appeared in the early 1990s. 
26 This information is based on per- 
sonal experience. I was a teacher in 
Gao Village for three years during 
the early 1970s. 
27 This is calculated on the basis of 
my personal experience when I was 
living in the village. 
28 There is no statistics available in 
the village. The estimate is based 
on interviews with the villagers 
and consumption patterns of my 
brothers' families. 
29 My mother used to tell us again 
and again a story of how the land- 
lord once carried a pig and gave it 
to her family after he had heard 
that my mother had no meat for the 
Spring Festival. 
30 As we have seen previously, the 
most notable indi;ation that the 
peasants were worse off before 
1949 is that they could not do much 
if their children fell ill because 
there was no modern medicine 
available. 
The number of working days is 
taken from the village account 
books. As for the hours and hard 
work on irrigation organized by 
the commune, I myself had experi- 
enced them. One would assume, as 
one anonymous reader of this pa- 
per reminds, that working days 
during the commune period were 
inflated as a result of a lack of in- 
centives. Given the nature of agri- 
cultural work in Gao Village, 
whether one works hard is very 
difficult to quantify. From my own 
experience, however, a lack of in- 
centives did not seem to be a major 
problem in Gao Village during the 
commune period. 
32 Again, theEe is no official record for 
this. This conclusion was drawn 
Mobo C. F. Gao 
after repeated interviews during 
which the villagers I interviewed 
recalled and counted what they 
could remember. From my own 
experience in Gao Village, floods 
were of routine life. 
33 In Boyang County, which has a 
population of a little more than one 
million by the late 1980s, more than 
3,000 irrigation projects were car- 
ried out in the 1949 to 1989 period. 
Some projects were very large and 
tens of thousands of people were 
involved. One such a project in 
1975 involved one hundred thou- 
sand peasants. In forty years, more 
than two hundred and thirty mil- 
lion labour-days were mobilized in 
irrigation work in Boyang County. 
See Zheng Chaojing, Hong Laishun 
and Li Bingcai, eds., Boyang xian shuili 
zhi (The Irrigation Annals of Boyang 
County) (Shanghai: Tongji Daxue 
Chubanshe, 1992), p. 4. 
34 Compared with neighbouring vil- 
lages Gao Village is in a very dis- 
advantageous position in this re- 
spect. Because of the location of the 
village, it takes an enormous a- 
mount of work to build a dam to 
protect the small amount of the 
village land. For this reason during 
the commune period, the local 
authorities never thought it worth- 
while to organize sufficient man- 
power to build a dam for Gao Vil- 
lage. On the other hand, because of 
the structure and organization of 
the commune system, Gao villagers 
had to send able men and women 
almost every year during the 1960s 
and 1970s to carry out irrigation 
work that benefited other villages 
(with no compensation). Gao vil- 
lagers are still resentful about this 
fact. They think this was not only 
because Gao Village was too small 
to have any influence in decision- 
making but also because Gao Vil- 
lage had no connections in the 
power structure. As a matter of 
fact, the two factors are intercon- 
nected: local leaders are never cho- 
sen from a small village like Gao 
Village. For more detailed discus- 
sion on the local power connections 
and how it effects Gao Village see 
Mobo Gao, The Dareloprnent of Gao Vil- 
lage since 1949: A Case Study (London: 
Hurst and Co., forthcoming ). 
35 This picture is based on my per- 
sonal experience and recollections. 
36 Information obtained from interviews. 
37 For this information I had to ask 
the old villagers during my inter- 
views to recall one by one who 
lived until when. 
38 Gao Village household registration 
book. 
39 In one of the worst effected areas, 
Yugan County in Jiangxi Province, 
twenty villages were wiped out of 
existence by the disease. In 1956, 
under Mao's directive, a task force 
committee was set up and was 
headed by Ke Qingshi. By mid 1958 
the epidemic was under control. 
See Wu Xiaomai and Liu Lian, Mao 
Zedong zouchu hongqiang (Away 
From the Red Walls: Mao Zedong 
on Tour) (Beijing: Zhongyang 
Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1993). 
40 In 1991, the national average per- 
sonal income in the Chinese coun- 
tryside was 710 RMB. But in the 
same year there were sixty million 
Chinese peasants whose personal 
annual income was about 200 RMB 
which is said to be the official Chi- 
nese poverty line (see, The Econo- 
mist June 6,1992, p. 26). 
41 The former figures is taken from 
the village account book. The latter 
figure is calculated on the basis of 
interviews. 
42 In 1979, the price for agricultural 
produce was raised by 25 percent 
to 40 percent. Furthermore, the 
amount of compulsory purchase of 
grains by the state was also re- 
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duced. See James Kaising Kung, 
"Food and Agriculture in Post-Re- 
form China, the Market Surplus 
Problem Revisited," Modwn China, Vol. 
18, No. 2 (April 1991), pp. 138-70. 
43 For the amount of taxes and levies 
imposed by the government and 
local authorities during the late 
1980s and early 1990s and their ef- 
fects on the farmers' life in Gao 
Village, see Mobo C. F. Gao, "Mi- 
grant Workers from Rural China: 
Their Conditions and Some Social 
Implications for the Economic De- 
velopment in South China," in 
David Schak, ed., Entrepreneurship, 
Economic Growth and Social Change: 
the Transformation of Southern China 
(Nathan: Centre for the Study of Au- 
stralia-Asia Relations, 1994), pp. 21-38. 
44 See China Nem Analysis, (April 1993), 
No. 1483 and (September 1993), No. 
1492. 
45 See, for instance, R. H. Tawney, 
Land 2nd Labour in China (London: 
Allen & Urwin, 1932); and J. L. 
Buck, Land Utilization in China 
(New York: Paragon Book Reprint 
Corp., 1964). 
46 It is worth observing what Fei 
Xiaotong had to say in 1947: "The 
levies on the peasantry were such 
that grain producers cannot make a 
living any more. Thus a strange 
phenomenon occurred: those who 
do not produce grain have grain to 
consume whereas those who do do 
not. In order to live the peasants 
have to leave the land. This is hap- 
pening everywhere recently" (My 
own translation). See Fei Xiaotong, 
"Lun cheng, shi, zhen," (On the Ci- 
ty, the Market and the Town), in 
Fei Xiaotong, Xiangtu chongjian (The 
Re-Construction of the Countryside) 
(Shanghai: Shanghai Guanchashe, 
1948), p. 39. 
47 As for the reasons of why the price 
of chemicals is so high, see Chen 
Feng, "Huafei de shengchan, gong- 
ying he xiaoshou de genben wenti 
ji chulu" (The Fundamental Prob- 
lems underlying the Production, 
Supply and Sales of Chemical Fer- 
tilizers and the Way Out) in Gaige 
sikno (Contemplating the Reform) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo zhuoye chu- 
banshe, 1992). 
48 Traditionally, the major crop in the 
area is rice. There are three main 
factors hindering the villagers' de- 
cision to grow economy crops 
which may fetch a higher price. 
One is that they need enough grain 
to feed themselves. Another is the 
difficulty of finding a ready mar- 
ket, and finally it is the lack of ac- 
cessible technology. 
49 The punitive nature of farming is 
not only confined to Gao Village. It 
was reported in the Chinese official 
press that even in prosperous Zhe- 
jiang province peasants are not re- 
warded for producing grain. Zhuo 
Shengshan in Songdao xiang of 
Ningbo city was a famous grain 
producer who contracted 250 mu of 
land for grain production. Since 
1990 he ran a loss every year and 
now his debts has reached 120,000 
RMB. See Cai Jizheng and Jiang Li, 
"Zhongliang dahu weihe biancheng 
fuzai dahu" (How did a big grain 
producing household become a big 
debt household), Ban yue tan, 1994, 
No. 19, pp. 32-33. 
50 This example of Gao Changxian is 
also cited in Schak, ed., Entrepreneur- 
ship, Economic Grozuth and Social Change. 
51 Also see A. Saith, ed., The Re- 
Emergence of the Chinese Peasantry: 
Aspects of Rural Decollectivization 
(London: Crown Helm, 1987). 
52 Wang Guichen and Xiao Decheng, 
Zhongguo nongye chanye jiegou (Pro- 
ductive Structure in Rural China) 
(Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991) 
p. 54. 
53 See Lai Ruihua and Jiang Xiexin, 
Zhongguo nongye zijin wenti yanjiu 
Mobo C. F. Gao 
(The Problems of Funding Agricul- 
ture) (Beijing: Renmin Daxue Chu- 
banshe, 1991). Also see Gao cited 
above for case study in this respect. 
54 According to The China Daily, 
March 19, 1993, Vice-premier Zhu 
Rongji stressed again that all the 
existing taxes and levies except the 
authorized 5 percent imposed on 
farmers should be stopped right 
away. But he stopped short of pre- 
senting any measure to do this. 
55 On March 18, 1993, Renmin Ribao 
published a directive by the Minis- 
try of Agriculture which prohibits 
ten ways of taxing the peasants by 
local cadres. However, as the old 
Chinese saying goes "Tian gao 
huangdi yuan" (The heaven is high 
up and the emperor is far away), so 
whether these kinds of measures are 
effective remains to be seen. 
56 For the conditions of migrant wor- 
kers and their earnings see Gao 
(1994) cited above and also Gao, 
"Welfare Problems and Needs for 
Migrant Workers in South China," 
in Joseph Cheng and Wing Lo, eds., 
Welfare in South China (forthcoming). 
57 The figure of Yinbao xiang, which 
has a population of 20,000, was 
given to me by the head of the 
xiang government Jin Shihui during 
an interview in December 1992. 
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